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Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal
Code Revisions

The Model Penal Code Sentencing project proposes a

important to note that Council Draft No. 2 does not

RICHARD S.
F RASE

model based on three decades of successful state sentencing guidelines reforms.' The latest installment in this
project, Council Draft No. 2,2 recommends elimination of

address general retroactivity issues arising when guidelines are revised to lower sentence severity; that matter

Benjamin N. Berger
Professor of
Criminal Law,
University of
Minnesota

parole-release discretion, as more than half of the guidelines states have done.3 But the draft recognizes the need
for such a determinate system to allow various "second
looks" and other postsentencing modifications of a prison
sentence, particularly in the case of very long sentences.

At the time of this writing it appears that some of the
second look provisions in Council Draft No. 2 may be
deleted or substantially modified before they are submit-

was already addressed in a set of revised Code provisions
approved in 2007.7

The draft further concludes that pardon and commutation
powers cannot provide adequate second look authority.
Council Draft No. 2 proposes three procedures4 for
postsentencing modifications:

ted to the membership for approval. The ALI Council, at
its meeting on December 4, 2oo8, decided not to submit
this Draft to the membership at the May 2oo9 annual
meeting. The consensus on the Council seemed to be that,
although some sort of general second look provision for
very long sentences is warranted, Section 305.6 needs fur-

i. "good conduct sentence reductions (Section 305.1);
2.

sentence reduction based on advanced age or infirmity (Section 305.7); and

3. sentence reduction based on other changed circumstances of the offense or offender, after the sentence
was imposed (Section 3o5.6).
The first of these, like similar existing state and federal
provisions, is administered entirely by correctional authorities, whereas the second and third would involve, in
essence, a request for resentencing by the court. The second (age-infirmity) provision has many existing
counterparts in state laws,5 but the third provision has
6
almost none.
All three provisions focus on the offender's acts
and/or changed circumstances postsentencing. The
apparent intent is not to give the correctional authorities
and the sentencing judge (or more often, a different
judge) broad power to revisit the wisdom of the original
sentence; nor are these provisions intended as a general
attack on very long prison terms (that problem is
addressed by other features of the revised Code, in particular. the use of an independent commission to draft
recommended sentences; sentencing policy formulation
that is informed by fiscal and demographic impact
assessments; adoption of an overall sentencing philosophy that emphasizes the importance of avoiding
disproportionately or unnecessarily severe penalties; and
provision for appellate review of sentences). It is also

ther drafting and should include a series of options rather
than a single proposal; as discussed more fully below, sev8
eral changes in Section 305.7 are also contemplated. But
whatever the fate of these particular provisions, the underlying policy issues and trade-offs will remain. The specific
proposals contained in Council Draft No. 2 provide as
good a vehicle as any for identifying and discussing these
important issues and trade-offs.
This essay begins by summarizing the three second
look provisions noted above, in the context of the Draft's
overall rejection of parole release discretion. Part I of
the essay examines the substantive sentence-reduction
rationales that underlie one or more of the three second
look provisions. Part III looks at the Draft's proposed
second look procedures. Part IV focuses on the third provision (other changed circumstances), which seems to be
the most controversial, and examines various arguments
against having any such provision. The essay concludes
that, despite these arguments and the problems of substance and procedure examined earlier, the two most
important policy recommendations in Council Draft No.
a are sound-routine parole release discretion must be
abolished, but several second look options must be available, including some sort of general second look
provision (beyond pardon and commutation, good-conduct reductions, age-infirmity release, and retroactive
application of reductions in guidelines severity). At a
minimum, such a general provision is needed in the
case of life sentences.
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1. Summary of Second Look Proposals in Council
Draft No. 2
The three second look proposals in this Draft will be
examined after a brief look at their broader context-the
Drafts proposal to abandon parole-release discretion and
its conclusion that the void left by parole abolition cannot
be filled by existing or foreseeable executive pardon and
commutation powers. The author and advisors of the
Draft believe that state and federal experience inspires little confidence that either parole discretion or
pardon-commutation procedures can make second look
decisions with consistency, transparency, and legitimacy.
A. Rejection of General Parole Release Discretion
and Traditional Clemency Procedures
Parole release discretion assumes that a parole board or
similar body can accurately assess a particular inmate's
progress toward rehabilitation and risk of postrelease
recidivism, based primarily on the inmate's conduct in
prison and the evaluations made by prison staff. But prison
environments bear little resemblance to life on the street;
some offenders are model prisoners yet quickly return to
crime once released; other inmates adapt poorly to prison
life but misbehave much less after release than they did in
prison. Moreover, inmates (and perhaps some staff) have a
strong incentive to deceive the parole board. It is thus no
surprise that research finds parole assessments to be very
unreliable (and probably also very inconsistent) unless they
are based on the offender's current and prior convictions.9
But these factors are already known when the offender
enters prison; sentencing judges can assess such factors
with greater transparency and legitimacy.
It might be argued that the problems above can be
remedied. Parole board decisions could be made more
consistent, transparent, and legitimate if they were structured by releasing guidelines and accompanied by
statements of reasons; the risk assessments underlying
those decisions could be made more reliable if they incorporated the latest research on factors associated with
higher and lower risk. But in the view of the author and
advisors of Council Draft No. 2, this alternative model is a
theoretical one; its workability is unknown and untested,
whereas there has been considerable experience and success with the parole-abolition, sentencing guidelines
model proposed in the Draft. Given the widespread dissatisfaction with parole release systems (except on the part of
paroling authorities themselves), the burden is on those
who support that model to identify systems that have
already been proven to work and enjoy widespread support. And if supporters of the "improved parole" model
point to new, "evidence-based" risk-assessment tools, they
should be prepared to demonstrate that these tools and
their practical application have been validated empirically,
and that the best prediction factors cannot be known and
applied by courts at the time of initial sentencing.
Parole release discretion, at least when exercised by a
single, statewide body using some sort of offense/prior
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record guidelines, can still be helpful in systems that give
sentencing judges unchecked discretion.Io But when
judges use sentencing guidelines subject to appellate
review their decisions are likely to be at least as consistent
as the parole board's. Finally, broad parole release discretion causes serious problems of dishonesty and poor
resource management. The public and especially crime
victims lose respect for a system in which a lengthy prison
sentence imposed in court turns into a far shorter term
actually served. On the other hand, parole boards are
increasingly risk averse, so the option of early release is
often an illusion, disappointing inmates and their families, and escalating correctional costs. Contrary to the
assumption that parole release discretion helps to control
prison growth and overcrowding, data show prison populations growing less in states with guidelines combined
with parole abolition."
As for pardon and commutation, the author and advisors of Council Draft No. 2 were apparently of the view
that these powers have been used so sparingly, and with so
little consistency and transparency, that they have not and
can not serve as adequate second look procedures. Nor are
such procedures a legitimate way to provide what is, or
should be, essentially a resentencing based on changed
sentencing facts. Judges should sentence, not governors
and presidents.
B. The Draft's Proposed Good-Conduct Reductions
Section 305.1 of the Draft provides that an inmate is presumptively entitled to a reduction in his or her
court-ordered determinate sentence unless the Department of Corrections determines that the inmate has
.committed a criminal offense or a serious violation" of
institutional rules and/or "has failed to participate satisfactorily in work, education, or other rehabilitation
programs" as ordered by the court or the Department. The
Draft recommends a minimum credit of 15 percent and
suggests that some states might wish to use a higher figure and/or might provide that credits earned in a year or
other time period would "vest" and not be subject to withdrawal for later misconduct.12
The Draft seeks to strike a balance between narrower
and broader alternatives. It rejects arguments that participation in prison programs should be entirely voluntary
and have no effect on "good time" reductions; on the other
hand, the Draft also rejects arguments that the minimum
credit should be much higher than 15 percent, to give
inmates a stronger incentive to participate in programming. And consistent with its rejection of broad parole
release discretion, the Draft only requires "satisfactory"
program "participation" and does not appear to contemplate that corrections officials will attempt to assess and
base the award of credits on actual change in the offender,
in particular, the offender's successful rehabilitation or
progress toward that goal.
The balance struck by the Draft is debatable on several
points. In particular, the minimum 15 percent credit is
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arguably too low, and too few states may take seriously the
Drafts suggestion to consider a higher figure. Minnesota,
for example, has used a 33 percent good time credit since
I98O, and some guidelines states allow as much as 50 percent. 3 The 15 percent figure does not do much to curtail
very long sentences, and it may not provide sufficient
incentives for in-prison program participation. Nor is
there any particular wisdom embodied in this number it
lacks empirical support and originated in a 1994 toughon-crime bill linking federal funding for state prison
construction to the adoption of "truth in sentencing" laws
under which prisoners would have to serve at least 85 per4
cent of their sentences.
C. The Draft's Two "Back-to-Court"
Second Look Provisions
Section 6ioA of the Draft provides two procedures permitting judicial modification of a sentence based on changed
circumstances. The more specific of these, Section
6ioA(2), allows the court to reduce a prison sentence at
any time based on advanced age or physical or mental
infirmity, provided the Department of Corrections recommends the change and pursuant to the further provisions
of Section 3o5.7.I5 A more open-ended, but also more
time-limited, provision, Section 6ioA(i), allows for a single petition for sentence reduction based on "changed
circumstances," to be made with or without Department
recommendation after the inmate has served at least fifteen years in prison, and subject to the further provisions
of Section 305.6.
Under both procedures, if a hearing is held, the court
may appoint counsel for indigent inmates (however, under
Section 305.6 the Draft Commentary indicates that counsel will normally not be appointed unless a hearing is
held, and that most petitions are expected to be denied
without a hearing).' 6 The prosecution and crime victims
or representatives may participate in such hearings; the
court must then decide "within a reasonable time," stating
reasons; either side may then petition for discretionary
appellate review, the modified sentence may be no more
severe than the remaining sentence was before the hearing; it may be less severe than any applicable mandatory
minimum term; and the Sentencing Commission is
directed to promulgate and periodically revise guidelines
for courts to use when considering whether to grant either
type of sentence modification.
Although the specific substantive grounds for sentence
modification differ under the two procedures, they have a
common normative frame of reference-the court is
directed to consider whether the specific grounds (ageinfirmity;, other changed circumstances) "justiflies] a
different sentence in light of the purposes of sentencing in
S1.02(2)."7 The latter provision states the revised Code's
overall "limiting retributive" model: crime-control, restorative, and reintegrative purposes operate "within a range of
severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms
done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offend-
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ers."' 8 Within that range, sentences must be "no more
severe than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes"' 9
of the sentence (under the limiting retributive model
above). The latter concept is sometimes referred to as sentencing "parsimony."20
1. Advanced Age or Physical or Mental Infirmity (Sections 610A(2) and 305.7) The Comment to Section
305.7 implies that, in light of the purposes in Section
1.02(2), advanced age or serious infirmity would justify
early release if, inter alia, the offender is so feeble as to no
longer be dangerous." An alternative rationale would be
that incarceration is much more onerous for such an
offender, making continued custody disproportionate or
even cruel. As noted above, the Section 305.7 procedure
may be invoked at any time during an inmate's prison
term, and may be invoked more than once; but as also
noted, such invocation requires a favorable motion by the
Department of Corrections.
Although the grounds for modification under Section
305.7 as currently drafted are quite narrow, it appears that
in the ALI-Council requested redrafting process22 this provision will be expanded to also include any "extraordinary
and compelling circumstances" justifying modification
(again, in light of the purposes in Section 1.02(2)). This
modification standard is similar to the one found in the
current federal second look provision, i8 U.S.C.
S3582(c)(I)(A)(i). The latter provision, like Section 305.7,
requires approval by the director of the Bureau of Prisons
and, perhaps for that reason, seems to be very rarely
invoked.2 3Nevertheless, expansion of Section 305.7 seems
appropriate as a supplement to Section 305.6 (below),
given the limited scope of that provision (applicable only
after fifteen years, and only once).
2. Other Changed Circumstances, Postsentencing (Sections 610A(1) and 305.6) Section 305.6 directs the
court to consider whether there is "a change of circumstances since the original sentencing that justifies a
different sentence in light of the purposes of sentencing in
S 1.02(2)" (under the "limiting retributive" model summarized above). The open-ended "change of circumstances"
language is given more specific content in the Draft Comment, which gives a number of examples of sentences
that, although not excessive when first imposed, have
become so over time due to such things as changed societal assessments of offense gravity, new technologies of risk
assessment or treatment; or major changes in the
offender, the offender's family circumstances, the crime
24
victim(s), or the community.
In procedural terms, this provision is both broader and
narrower than Section 305.7 (the advanced age or infirmity
provision, discussed above). Section 305.6 "change of circumstances" petitions do not require a supporting motion
by the Department of Corrections; on the other hand, they
may only be filed after the inmate has served at least fifteen years (which, with a I5 percent good-conduct credit,
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effectively requires an original sentence of at least eighteen years), 25 and such a petition may only be filed once, no
matter how long the sentence.
Prior to the December 2oo8 ALI Council meeting
there was apparently some support on the Council to
delete Section 305.6 entirely because it has almost no
existing state or federal counterpart and could prove very
burdensome to courts (see further discussion below). But
instead the Council proposed to redraft Section 305.6,
while also expanding Section 305.7.26
II. Assessing the Substantive Rationales and Standards
of the Draft's Second Look Provisions
The second look sentence reduction provisions in Council
Draft No. z assume that some offenders merit sentence
reduction, in light of governing sentencing purposes, based
on facts that could not be known at the time of the original
sentencing. These standards and rationales seem to fall
into at least four categories, discussed below. (i) changes in
the offender (2) the offender's meritorious postsentencing
acts; (3) changes in other people (the offender's family, the
victim, the community); and (4) changes in how society
views the offender's crime or specific relevant sentencing
factors. The rationales in the first category help to justify
two of the Draft's second look provisions: age-infirmity and
changed-circumstances. The rationales in the second category are relevant to the Drafts good-time and
changed-circumstances provisions; the third and fourth
categories seem to apply only to the changed-circumstances provision. All four rationales would apply under
the proposed catchall "extraordinary and compelling circumstances" expected to be added to Section 305.7.
The details of these substantive rationales would have
to be filled in by the courts, with guidance from the sentencing commission. But it is necessary to consider, even
if somewhat abstractly, the various types of changed-circumstances cases that might arise under one or more
second look provisions, in order to decide on whether and
when to even allow such second looks.
One overall question, which arises under each of the
four categories, is whether the recognition of a given sentence-reduction rationale is consistent with the reasons
(summarized above) behind the Draft's rejection of routine parole release discretion-if we don't trust parole
boards to consider such factors in highly individualized
offender assessments, why should such factors and assessments affect good-time and resentencing?
A. Change in the Offender or in Our Assessment of
the Offender
Various changes in the offender since the time of the original sentence could make that sentence excessive in light
of one or more relevant sentencing purposes, thus justifying or perhaps even requiring a sentence reduction.
1. Effects of Age and/or Infirmity (Section 305.7) Such
effects are arguably more "objective" than other offender-
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change variables, but their relationship to risk or sentence
disproportionality are not easily measured. Nevertheless,
the widespread adoption of such "compassionate" release
procedures,27 and the economic incentive prisons have to
invoke them (given the high cost of providing medical care
to such inmates), suggest that age and infirmity are
important and viable second look criteria.
2. Treatment Effects (Section 305.6) If this rationale
involves assessment of the offender's progress toward rehabilitation, it suffers from the same critique the Draft levels
against traditional parole. The Draft gives these decisions to
courts, rather than an administrative board, but it is not dear
that courts are any better suited to make these difficult
assessments. On the other hand, the traditional parole system required such assessments in all cases, whereas the
Draft views them as exceptional. Some state guidelines
reforms seem to have made a similar distinction between
routine versus exceptional (grounds-for-departure) assessments of risk and amenability to treatment.2 8 It should also
be noted that, under current federal law, the defendanfs postsentence rehabilitation cannot, by itself, be an "extraordinary
and compelling reason' justifying a sentence reduction.29
3. Failure to Satisfactorily Participate in Treatment
(Section 305.1) Arguably, this criterion is easier to
assess reliably and consistently than treatment progress,
although the requirement of "satisfactory" participation
brings back many of the problems of traditional parole
assessments. And these good-time-related assessments
under Section 3o5.I apply to most offenders, not just
exceptional cases. But the fact that some guidelines states
have included program participation in good-time provisions 30 suggests that such assessments are a workable
basis for second look sentence modification.
4. Religious or Other Conversion (Section 305.6) It is
not clear if the Draft endorses this rationale, although the
Comment mentions "the possibility of transformation in
an offender's character."3' Even in exceptional cases, however, such changes would seem to be extraordinarily
difficult for a court to assess reliably and consistently.
5. New Technologies of Treatment and for Assessing
Risk and Progress in Treatment If the original prison
term was enhanced based on predicted risk and/or a finding of unamenability to treatment, major subsequent
improvements in risk assessment or treatment technology, combined with the overall parsimony principle
described above (no more severe than necessary), justify
and indeed require resentencing. But to avoid a mass of
claims, many with battling experts, such technology
improvements and their application to the inmate's case
must be clear. For these kinds of claims it might be particularly appropriate to seek the recommendation or at least
the advice of correctional authorities (see further discussion of "gatekeeping" issues, below).
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B. Meritorious Postsentencing Behavior
The criteria in this category do not necessarily presuppose
any change in the offender him- or herself. Instead, such
sentence reductions provide incentives for desired behavior and are also viewed as meriting a reward for its own
sake. Similar important practical and moral considerations underlie plea bargaining concessions and charge or
sentence reductions given in return for helpful testimony
or other cooperation with law enforcement.
The Draft expressly recognizes only one form of meritorious inmate conduct-his or her compliance with
criminal laws, institutional rules, and requirements to participate in programs. Each of these bears on how much
.good-time" credit the inmate will receive under Draft Section 305.1. But there are other kinds of postsentencing
meritorious conduct that might warrant sentence reduction. Section 305.1 of the original Model Penal Code
provided that inmates could earn an additional six-days-permonth sentence reduction (in addition to the basic six-day
good-conduct credit) for "especially meritorious behavior or
exceptional performance of his duties." The first half of this
provision seemed to contemplate things like saving a guard
or inmate's life, assisting in preventing riot or assault, and
preventing escape or assisting in recapture. The second
half of the provision allowed parole authorities to distinguish superior versus merely adequate performance of
institutional duties. The Draft implicitly handles such cases
under the general changed-circumstances provision (Section 305.6), but perhaps they belong in an expanded
Section 305.1 (especially if, as was recommended above,
that provision is amended to propose or more strongly
encourage adoption of good-time credits greater than 15
percent). These cases could, of course, also be handled
under the "extraordinary and compelling circumstances"
provision expected to be added to Section 305.7.
C. Change in Offender Family Circumstances, the
Victim, and/or the Community (Section 305.6)
These sorts of changes are briefly mentioned in the Draft
Comment. 32 Although one can easily imagine postsentencing changes in family, victim, or community
circumstances that would appropriately bear on one or
more purposes or limits of punishment (e.g., the death of
the only suitable caregiver to the offender's small
children; 33 successful victim-offender mediation), the
potential number and diversity of such claims could
swamp courts with petitions that are impossible to distinguish without a hearing. Thus, such claims are probably
best handled by a general "extraordinary and compelling
circumstances" provision, applicable any time during a
prison term.

D. Change in Societal View of the Inmate's Crime
(Section 305.6)
Sometimes certain criminal acts come to be widely viewed

as less serious than previously thought, or perhaps as not
even worthy of being criminally punished. Such change in
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societal views might relate to a particular crime as a whole,
certain aspects of the crime or of the offender's role in it,
or any other offense-related sentencing factor. However,
this category should probably be deemed to include only
such societal changes as have not yet manifested themselves in the enactment of reduced penalties or outright
decriminalization. When such penalty reductions or
decriminalization have been enacted, the case should be
governed by the Code's retroactivity provisions. 34
But when reduced penalties or decriminalization have
not yet been enacted, how are courts to determine whether
and to what extent a more lenient societal consensus has
emerged? The Draft Comment cites, as examples, changing views about battered victims who kill their batterer
euthanasia or assisted suicide; and certain substance
abuse crimes such as those involving alcohol, marijuana,
and crack cocaine. Major change has surely occurred in
how society views these crimes, but at what point was
such change sufficiently clear and substantial to justify
sentence modifications? And how can courts avoid appearing to invade the legislature's domain? This seems like an
area much more appropriate for legislative or sentencing
commission policy making and retroactivity, which courts
would then apply-with greater consistency and legitimacy-to entire groups of offenders.
Ill. Assessing the Draft's Second Look Procedures
Several of the substantive second look issues catalogued
above also raised important procedural problems or alternative solutions. The discussion below examines a longer
(though still not exhaustive) list of procedural issues. As
with the substantive rationales and standards examined in
Part II, procedural details would have to be worked out by
the legislature, sentencing commission, and courts in
each jurisdiction. But it is worthwhile considering these
issues in general terms, in order to decide whether and
under what circumstances to authorize various second
look mechanisms.
A. Who Decides?
The Drafts three second look provisions take different
approaches to this question: good-time credits are decided
entirely by correctional authorities, whereas courts decide
whether to reduce a sentence based on age-infirmity or
other changed conditions. Since good-time is so central to
maintaining prison security, and "unsatisfactory" program
participation is so much of a judgment call, there is probably no way for courts to play a useful role in these
decisions. The age-infirmity cases, and most of the otherchanged-conditions cases, seem better suited to judicial
control-indeed, these are essentially "resentencing"
issues, which courts should control. But as was suggested
in Part I I.D, claims about changed societal views involve
quasi-legislative issues that apply to whole groups of
offenders; decisions about whether such a change has
occurred, and to what extent, should therefore be left to
the legislature or the sentencing commission.
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The two decision makers contemplated in Council Draft
No. 2 are not, of course, the only possibilities. At the
December 2oo8 ALl Council meeting other suggestions
included panels of retired judges; administrative law judges;
the sentencing commission; or an improved parole board.

narrower, "extraordinary and compelling circumstances"
provision that can be applied at any time. As noted above,
it appears that such a provision will be added to Section
305.7, and that the requirement of corrections department
support in that section will be bracketed (made optional).

1. The Need for a Gatekeeper
Even for those second
look claims which are suitable for judicial or other noncorrections-department adjudication, there is a separate
issue of whether the corrections department or some
other gatekeeper is needed to screen these claims or assist
courts in screening them. The current federal statute, i8
U.S. C. S3582(c)(I)(A)(I), gives the Bureau of Prisons a
claim-barring role that arguably goes too far-corrections
officials are not professional sentencers, and in some
cases staff animosities or favoritism might distort the corrections position as to sentence reduction. On the other
hand, corrections officials have more information than
anyone else about the inmate, have a useful comparative
perspective (claims or potential claims of other inmates),
and are at least as expert as courts are on some matters
related to sentencing such as risk and amenability assessment. It has already been noted that changed-conditions
claims involving supposed new technologies are particularly suited for correctional gatekeeping. Perhaps
age-infirmity claims are another example, but it still seems
that Section 305.7 goes too far and that corrections officials should only state their views, not act as a true
gatekeeper. Indeed, perhaps corrections officials should be
expected to state their views in all cases. But for most types
of age-infirmity and other-changed-conditions cases, it
should be made clear that the ultimate decision is for the
court, and that courts must not reflexively rubber-stamp
corrections recommendations.
Based on discussions at the ALI Council meeting in
December 2008 it appears that in future drafts of the
MPC second look provisions any recommendation of a
gatekeeper role for the Department of Corrections will be
bracketed (that is, an optional element of the proposed
model), and that jurisdictions will be encouraged to consider other agencies or officials who might be given the
gatekeeper role, including the sentencing commission.

2. Only One Shot The changed circumstances procedure
provided in Section 3o5.6 can only be invoked once. This
obviously can pose extremely difficult choices for inmatesapply early, to maximize the potential size of the sentence
reduction; or apply later, to present stronger arguments for
changed circumstances after the original sentencing. The
inmate's choice would be somewhat less difficult if there
were a backup procedure other than through the age-infirmity provisions of Section 305.7. Again, the expected
addition of an "extraordinary and compelling circumstances" provision to that section will lessen these problems.

B. Other Procedural Barriers to Relief
1. The Fifteen-Year Rule The Section 305.6 changedcircumstances procedure can only be invoked after the
inmate has served at least fifteen years. The rationale for
this limitation seems to be both substantive and practical.
Most types of changed circumstances (surveyed in Part II)
become more likely to apply over a lengthy period of time.
And if there is no gatekeeper for these petitions, it is necessary to use some sort of arbitrary time-served measure
to limit the burdens such petitions place on the courts.
Still, many circumstances meriting sentence modification
will arise before fifteen years have been served. One compromise solution to this problem would be to add a
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C. Right to Counsel and Other Assistance
Counsel can be appointed under either of the back-tocourt provisions, but counsers assistance seems unlikely
to be available very often; either the corrections department will decline to make an age-infirmity motion
(Section 305.7), or the Court will deny the inmate's petition without a hearing and without appointing counsel
(Section 305.6; the Comment indicates that most petitions
will be denied without a hearing, and that counsel would
usually only be appointed if a hearing is granted).35 Given
the potential volume of such petitions, and the alreadyoverstretched resources of public defense programs, this
sparing grant of appointed counsel rights may be necessary. Still, inmates will need help in preparing their pro se
petitions (and in deciding how soon to file them), so it
seems appropriate to require the Department of Corrections to provide lay advisors (and sometimes access to free
legal advice) to inmates who have become eligible to file a
petition under Section 305.6.
D. The Ban on Increasing the Severity of
Modified Sentences
The provisions based on age-infirmity (Section 305.7) and
general changed-circumstances (Section 3o5.6) both provide that a modified sentence may be no more severe than
the sentence already being served. Such an asymmetric
down-but-not-up rule is required by double-jeopardy principles. But it is not always self-evident what counts as a
.more severe" sentence, if the old and new sentences are
not directly commensurate, for instance, when a prison
term is lowered but much more onerous release conditions are added. To make the no-more-severe rule work in
such cases it will be necessary to devise equivalency scales
covering different sentence types.36
IV. Arguments against Including Any General ChangedCircumstances Resentencing Provision
Beyond the substantive and procedural issues noted above
(and the inevitable devils-in-the-details problems with any
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proposal), various arguments can be made against having
a second look provision akin to Section 305.6, or even the
narrow "extraordinary and compelling circumstances" provision proposed to be added to Section 305.7. None of
these arguments is fully persuasive, but they have considerable weight in the aggregate. However, the most likely
alternatives to such a Code provision, pardon and commutation (and in some jurisdictions, parole release
discretion), must also be kept in mind-do they avoid all
of these problems, and other problems?
A. Will Even a Narrow Second Look Option Unduly
Burden Courts and Counsel Resources?
Since Section 305.6 includes no corrections or other gatekeeper role (unlike the age-infirmity provisions of Section
305.7), it can be assumed that virtually all inmates will file
a petition at some point after they have served fifteen
years. It is hard to estimate the probable volume of these
petitions, or the smaller volume of hearings that will be
held, counsel appointed, and so on. Jurisdictions that
adopt the Code's full model (including an independent
and adequately financed commission, fiscal- and demographic-impact assessments, the overarching
proportionality and parsimony principles, appellate
review) should not have a high volume of very long sentences. But no one can know how thoroughly the Code's
recommendations will be applied; this will undoubtedly
vary considerably across jurisdictions. On the other hand,
the need for a vigorous second look procedure becomes
even stronger if, in fact, there are a large number of very
long sentences.
The ultimate issue is a familiar one in the law and particularly in criminal justice; to paraphrase the question the
lawyer puts to his client in a well-known New Yorker cartoon-how much justice can we afford?37 And how much
injustice? In particular, how can we ensure that the injustices remedied by effective second look procedures do not
further impoverish already-strained appointed counsel
resources, thus creating new injustices? At least in jurisdictions where appointed second look counsel are funded
from the same budget as direct-appeal and/or trial counsel, it will be necessary to increase those budgets; this can
be supported not only by the importance of ensuring effective counsel at all levels but also by the argument that
effective counsel-especially second look counsel-will
reduce correctional costs.
B. Would a Narrow Second Look Provision Prove
Illusory or Freakish in Practice?
Even if hearings are granted with some frequency (and
especially if they are not), will inmates rarely see much (or
any) reduction in their sentences? Here too, it is very hard
to predict how courts will apply a procedure that lacks any
direct counterpart in current practice. If relief is highly
sporadic, inmates will be (further) disillusioned, unjustified lengthy sentences will remain in force, and the rare
instances of relief will introduce a new form of disparity.
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On the other hand, the most likely alternative second look
procedures, pardon and commutation, face the same problems. Even in jurisdictions that seek to provide second
looks by means of parole release discretion, the promise of
release may be illusory or its application freakish if paroling authorities are politicized, are highly risk averse, or
render decisions without guidelines or other controls.
C. Do Even Narrow Provisions Undermine Front-End
Impact Assessments and Accountability?
One of the greatest practical benefits of commissionbased, parole-abolition guidelines is their proven ability to
generate accurate resource-impact predictions, which in
turn have allowed the states using this approach to avoid
prison overcrowding and court intervention, and set
appropriate priorities in the use of scarce and expensive
prison space) 8 A related benefit of determinate sentencing
is the greater honesty and accountability it imposes on policy making and adjudication. When offenders actually
serve most of the sentence imposed, legislators, prosecutors, and judges cannot act "tough on crime" while
claiming that back-end discretion will avoid excessive punishment, spiraling costs, and overcrowding. State
experience with parole-abolition guidelines suggests that
when front-end decision makers have to take responsibility for these consequences, they tend to legislate, charge,
and impose fewer very severe penalties.
Do these problems reappear when a second look, backdoor release mechanism is reintroduced? To some extent
that depends how often the procedure is used. Even if it is
rarely used, legislators, prosecutors, and judges will know
that any given law, charge, or sentence could be "adjusted"
later and this knowledge encourages dishonest and irresponsible use of severe measures. And if second look
sentence reductions are not rare, their unpredictability at
least partially diminishes the accuracy of resource-impact
projections. But again, what are the realistic second look
alternatives? If they are so rarely invoked as to be effectively nonexistent, the benefits of resource management
and accountability are purchased at the cost of injustice;
the system openly tolerates very long sentences that have
become unjustified due to changed circumstances.
V. Conclusion
Whether a general changed-circumstances provision is
invoked rarely or with greater regularity, the arguments
above, along with the difficult issues of substance and procedure discussed earlier, might suggest that even a narrow
provision should be a bracketed (that is, optional) Code
provision. But again, do the most likely alternatives, pardon and commutation, avoid these and other problems?
And what about life sentences? The Draft takes a
strong position against life without parole (other than as
an alternative to capital punishment),39 yet a life sentence without a regularly invoked second look provision
is, in effect, life without parole. The alternative of completely abolishing life sentences seems unrealistic, given
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the frequent use and long history of this penalty. Another
alternative would be to retain traditional parole release
solely for life sentences, as Minnesota did when it adopted
sentencing guidelines. But Minnesota's experience suggests that a narrow exception to parole abolition may not
remain narrow, the Minnesota legislature has been unable
to resist making more and more crimes subject to life with
parole.4° And even a limited version of traditional parole
release discretion is highly problematic, for the reasons
summarized earlier. Thus, some sort of nonoptional, regularly used, judicial second look provision must be provided
for life sentences (along with at least an age-infirmity provision for any offenders subject to life without parole).
For nonlife prison sentences, perhaps the Code's general changed-circumstances provisions (Section 305.6, and
the "extraordinary and compelling circumstances" provision expected to be added to Section 305.7) should be kept
quite narrow, to avoid the problems discussed in Part IV.
But the numerous, valid grounds for sentence modification must be accommodated, to avoid the injustice and
waste of sentences that no longer fit the crime and/or the
offender. Determinacy and indeterminacy each have great
value, and each has major drawbacks. An appropriate balance between them must be found, although the answers
may not be the same in all jurisdictions.
In striking this balance, it is particularly important to
distinguish between jurisdictions that have adopted most
of the Code's severity-restraining, state-guidelinesinspired model, and other jurisdictions that cannot or will
not go that far. Jurisdictions in the latter category will tend
to have a much higher volume of very long sentences.
These jurisdictions will thus require much broader and
more vigorous second look provisions; indeed, they may
be better advised to retain parole release discretion,
despite the many problems with that approach.
It may be that the federal system is, and will remain,
one of those "non-Code" jurisdictions. The two features of
state criminal justice which have encouraged many states
to adopt the Code's parsimonious model-the need to balance annual budgets, and the high proportion that prison
costs represent in those budgets-do not apply at the federal level; the federal government can simply "print
money" rather than balance the budget, and even runaway
corrections expenses remain a tiny portion of the total
national budget. Further increases in that tiny federal corrections fraction may seem worthwhile to Congress,
especially given the political imperative to appear "tough
on crime" (or at least, not "weak"). These fiscal and political realities of federal criminal justice are unlikely to
change, despite the current budget crisis and reform
atmosphere in Washington.
Notes
The American Law Institute (ALl) Model Penal Code: Sentencing project will revise the sentencing and corrections
provisions of the Code to reflect the many changes in American sentencing theory, law, and practice which have occurred
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since the original Code was approved in 1962. Professor
Kevin Reitz of the University of Minnesota Law School serves
as Reporter for this project. The first set of provisions to be
approved by the ALl Council and membership are contained
in Tentative Draft No. 1 (April 9, 2007) (approved at the May
2007 ALl annual meeting) ("TD-1"). For further background
on this project, see American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code: Sentencing, Report (April 11, 2003) ("April 2003
Report").
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing,
Council Draft No. 2 (September 12, 2008) ("CD-2"). See also
infra note 8, describing a more recent MPC draft which
became available as this essay went to press.
State guidelines systems as of January 2005 are summarized in Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:
Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 CouJM.
L. REV.1190 (2005).
As noted below, a fourth Code provision dealing with postsentencing modifications is the retroactivity provision contained
in Tentative Draft No. 1. In addition, Council Draft No. 2
appears to assume that a jurisdiction adopting the new Code
provisions may also retain traditional clemency (pardon and
commutation) procedures. CD-2 § 6.1OA, Comment a.
CD-2 § 305.7, Comment b.
CD-2 § 305.6, Comment a.
TD-1, Section 6B.11(3).
Personal communications to the author on December 5,
2008 and March 9, 2009 from Kevin Reitz, Reporter, Model
Penal Code: Sentencing. The March 9th communication,
received as this essay went to press, included the proposed
text of a new document, Discussion Draft No. 2, which will be
discussed but not voted on at the ALl Annual Meeting in May
2009. As expected, and as explained more fully in text, this
document makes several important changes in the second
look provisions that had been proposed in CD-2. Two changes
were made in MPC Sec. 305.7 (the age-infirmity provision):
1) a third grounds for sentence modification was added"extraordinary and compelling reasons"; and 2) for all three
grounds, the requirement of a favorable recommendation by
the department of corrections was bracketed (i.e., made
optional). Proposed Sec. 305.6 (applicable to other changed
circumstances since sentencing) was completely rewritten,
setting out general "principles of legislation" rather than specific proposed statutory language. These general principles
are the same as those that underlay the more specific proposals of CD-2, with three exceptions: 1) inmates would not
be limited to a single sentence-modification application
under Sec. 305.6; 2) states are invited to consider having an
independent agency screen prisoners' applications (see infra,
"The Need for a Gatekeeper"); and 3) a provision has been
added, confirming what was only implicit in CD-2-that these
"second looks" are to be based on changed circumstances,
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